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Abstract 
There is an abundance of existing literature which shows the presence of behavioral 
biases in professional sports. Researchers have used reference dependent preferences and loss 
aversion, to explain athlete the behavior of professional golfers. Existing literature showed that 
par of the hole (Elmore and Urbaczewski, 2019), par of the round (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011) 
and par of the tournament (Stone and Arkes, 2016) have all been identified as reference points 
for professional golfers on the PGA tour. In this paper, I analyze a new sample of golfers: DIII 
college golfers. I use a 4 part analysis to examine whether the reference dependent preferences 
model can help explain the behavior and performance of DIII male college golfers. I 
hypothesized that there exists a single reference point for DIII golfers which is greater than par. 
Furthermore, I hypothesized that golfers exhibit loss aversion as they change their behavior 
relative to the reference point.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Although standard economic theory explains the majority of human behavior, there is an 
abundance of literature that exemplifies the fact that individuals violate standard economic 
assumptions (Camerer, et. al 2004). One theory which explains behaviors outside the scope of 
standard economic assumptions is prospect theory. Prospect theory explains reference dependent 
preferences, a frequently studied topic in behavioral economics, which is the notion that the 
utility from an outcome depends on a comparison to reference points or reference levels. This 
notion has been extensively explored within the lab (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler et al., 
1997; Camerer et al., 1999); as well as in the field (Bartling et al., 2015; Allen et al., 2015; 
Anbarci et al., 2017; Ge, 2018).  
With regards to contexts within the field, sports are a commonly investigated area (Bartling 
et al., 2014; Allen et al., 2015; Anbarci et al., 2017). This is because scores from sports games 
provide researchers with a field dataset rather than create the need for experiments. This would 
include coaches using non-optimal kicking strategies in American football (Romer, 2002; 
Urschel and Zhuang, 2011), teams playing more aggressively in soccer (Bartling et al., 2015), 
and fans altering their tipping behavior following unexpected outcomes from basketball games 
(Ge, 2018). Thus, coaches, players and fans alike have been analyzed to highlight the presence of 
reference points within various sports.  
Numerous pieces of literature utilize team based sports when attempting to identify reference 
points (Bartling et al., 2015); however, Golf, unlike many other sports, is an individual sport and 
thus provides a perfect natural setting to investigate reference dependent preferences. The fact 
that a golfer’s results are solely influenced by his or her own decision making allows him or her 
to easily alter strategy in order to beat or obtain the reference point. For example, Phil 
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Mickelson, a Professional Golf Association (PGA) tour professional, was quoted at the 2015 
U.S. Open saying “[I] get to like the 12th hole and I’m three under par and I don’t want to have 
one hole hurt a round so I end up laying up.” This quote highlights decision making that can be 
explained by prospect theory. With regards to the round-level reference point, Mickelson 
recognized that he was in the domain of gains, under par, and altered his strategy to act more 
conservatively by laying up rather than going for the putting surface (the green) in 2 shots. This 
was done in order to try prevent obtaining a final score that was above par. The concept of par, 
as explained above, is an arbitrary measure designed to inform a golfer of the number of strokes 
expected to play the hole. It is usually defined as predetermined number of strokes it should take 
a golfer to complete a hole. In the Mickelson example, we see a setting in which par for the 
round acted as a reference point; however, par in numerous settings within professional golf has 
been proven to act as a reference point. Par of the hole (Elmore and Urbaczewski, 2019), par of 
the round (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011) and par of the tournament (Stone and Arkes, 2016) have 
all been identified as reference points for professional golfers on the PGA tour.1 Despite the 
recent rise in utilizing golf as a setting, there are other stakeholders, besides professional golfers, 
that have been blatantly ignored: amateur golfers. Amateur golfers are experienced decision 
makers that often act in high stakes environments; yet, amateur golf still remains a relatively 
untouched field of study. In fact, my paper is the first that I am aware of that utilizes amateur 
golf as a natural setting to test for reference dependent preferences. 
In this paper, I focused on a subgroup of amateur golfers: college golfers. The motivation to 
focus on college rather than professional athletes stemmed from the popularity that college 
athletics continue to receive in the U.S. In recent years, there have been numerous accounts of 
revealed statistics that highlight that college sports are in fact more popular that professional 
                                               
1 Par of the round is defined as the sum of the pars of each hole, normally 18, on a golf course. Similarly, Par of the 
tournament is defined as the sum of the pars of each round. 
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sports. For example, in the NFL, the Dallas Cowboys had the largest average attendance per 
game of 91,619 attendees. In comparison, Michigan university in 2018 had an average home 
attendance of 110,737 attendees.2  
Despite the widespread focus that college sports receive, a huge majority of this emphasis is 
centered around National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I (DI) sports. In fact, 
even within economics a large majority of literature is concentrated on DI and more focused 
toward the labor market characteristics of the NCAA (Parent, 2004; Sanderson and Siegfried, 
2015). However, like professional athletes, DI athletes are not a good representation of the 
general population. For example, the average vertical for a U.S. male is around 12 to 16 inches. 
Whereas, the average vertical of a DI college basketball player is approximately 27 to 30 inches. 
Thus, it is clear that DI athletes are a select group of athletically talented individuals and would 
not be a good target sample to deduce results for amateur golfers in general.  
Yet, the NCAA has broken college golf up into three divisions, with DI attracting the best 
quality players and Division III (DIII) attracting the worst quality players. This study explores 
this uncharted field of DIII, as it is a suitable sample that is closer to a general population in 
comparison to DI, and examines whether the reference dependent preferences model can help 
explain the behavior and performance of DIII male college golfers. I hypothesized that the 
number 80 serves as a reference point for DIII male college golfers. Moreover, I hypothesized 
that DIII male college golfers exhibit loss-aversive behavior.  
 To carry out the 4-part analysis I manually built 3 datasets. The first dataset utilized 
tournament results PDF’s extracted from an online golf scoring platform: Golfstat.com. 
Tournament results show the scores individual DIII players shot in each respective tournament 
during the Fall 2016 – Spring 2017 season. In the end, I obtained a sample of 6,543 tournament 
                                               
2 https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2018/12/05/Research-and-Ratings/CFB-Attendance.aspx 
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scores for DIII golfers. In the first part of the analysis I utilized a similar but abridged 
methodology adapted from Allen et al. (2015) where the authors focused on reference 
dependence amongst marathon runners by analyzing a distribution of running times for marathon 
runners. They found that 50.1% more runners finished within a minute before 3 hours than a 
minute after. Similarly, I analyzed the distribution of golf tournament scores and found that 
28.1% more DIII golfers shoot scores within 2 shots less than 80 in comparison to 2 shots more 
than 80.  
The second dataset consisted of survey responses from an online experiment that I conducted 
through Qualtrics Inc, an online survey platform, initiated in March 2019. The experiment was 
broken up into three sections: background information, golf scenario decision making test and 
golf performance statistics from the Fall of 2018. In the second part of the analysis I utilized the 
results from a series of decision-making tests in various golf scenarios. I found that DIII college 
golfers suffer from loss aversion. More specifically, when allowing golfers to choose their own 
reference point, rather than utilizing par as a reference point, DIII golfers take on more risk when 
faced with losses in comparison to when faced with gains. 
 In the third and fourth part of the analysis I utilized the answers from the golf performance 
statistics section of my survey and integrated that with scoring data from the Fall 2018 – Spring 
2019 season to conduct linear and probabilistic regression analyses. I found that when a DIII 
college golfer has a reference point in mind, if he increases his greens in regulation (GIR) by 1% 
he will decrease his stroke average by approximately 0.229 shots.3 Furthermore, I found that if a 
DIII college golfer has a reference score of 80 or below the probability that he will shoot a score 
under 80 is in fact 42.7%.  
                                               
3 Percentage of greens hit in regulation. 
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The overall takeaway of this study highlights that PGA professionals are not the only 
stakeholders in golf who are influenced by reference points. When I merged the results of the 
four sections of my analysis, I concluded that the number 80 was in fact a reference point in DIII 
golf, and in turn has an impact on not only their decision making but also influences their overall 
golf performance. 
This paper differs from previous literature in two ways. First, this paper focused on amateurs 
golfers rather than professional golfers. Second, it hypothesized an alternative reference point to 
that of par. In addition, this study not only highlighted how the risk behavior of DIII college 
golfers changed in certain scenarios, but it also showed the impact of a reference point on a 
golfers performance variables. 
This paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 explains the theoretical model; 
Section 3 reviews previous literature that examined reference dependence; Section 4 discusses 
my data and methodology; Section 5 analyzes the results from the 4-part analysis; Section 6 and 
7 conclude my findings, provide suggestions for future research and discuss potential limitations 
with this study.  
 
2.0 Theoretical Model 
Prospect theory is defined by three main axioms: reference dependent preferences, loss 
aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. Existing literature uses prospect theory to explain different 
athlete behavior across different sports. It is important to note that this paper and previous 
literature mainly focus on the first two axioms mentioned.  	
As previously mentioned, reference dependent preference is the notion that the utility 
from an outcome depends on a comparison to reference points or reference levels. Prospect 
theory is captured in a value function in which a gain is a point greater than the reference point 
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and a loss is a point less than the reference point. As shown in Figure 1, the inflection point in 
which the value function changes concavity is the reference point. In Figure 1, the reference 
point is zero, a dollar payout that is greater than zero is considered a gain. A dollar payout that is 
less than zero is considered a loss.                                                   	
The second cornerstone of prospect theory is loss aversion. Loss aversion states that 
people dislike losses more than they like same-sized gains. This is demonstrated in Figure 1, the 
value function below shows that a gain of (x2) generates less utility than a loss of (x1) generates in 
disutility. The magnitude gained in utility is less than the magnitude lost in disutility.  
Prospect theory can be applied to golf to explain golfers’ behavior outside the scope of 
standard economic theory. Previous literature has shown that professional golfers use par as a 
reference point and measure a gain or a loss by comparing their score relative to par. When 
shooting “under par” this is considered a gain and “over par” is considered a loss, thus 
demonstrating reference dependent preferences. Furthermore, if we consider the example of 
shooting “one under par” versus “one over par”  the magnitude of utility gained from “one under 
par” is less than the magnitude of disutility generated from shooting “one over par” thus 
demonstrating loss aversion. Loss aversion in golf results in a change in the strategy that a player 
utilizes on a given hole. This change in strategy could entail a move from a more aggressive 
approach (risk-seeking) to a more conservative one (risk-averse) or vice versa. This would occur 
if the golfer reaches their reference point before they complete the round, and instead of taking 
on a risky strategy the golfer decides to take a more conservative approach to ensure that they in 
fact achieve the reference point at the conclusion of the round. Lastly, when a golfer’s score is 
already “over par” they will devote less focus on their putts as any additional loss will generate 
lower disutility than the loss incurred before it; thus, demonstrating diminishing sensitivity. 	
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3.0 Literature Review 
The literature review is structured in the following the way: literature surrounding 
prospect theory, application of prospect theory on a team-based sport, investigations of prospect 
theory in individual sports, studies relating to prospect theory in golf, key differences between 
professionals and amateurs and lastly how my paper contributes to existing literature. 		
3.1 Background on Prospect Theory	
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested a reference dependent theory of choice in 
which individuals value gains differently than they value losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
utilized hypothetical choice problems, presented to students and university faculty members, and 
found that individuals valued gains and losses differently in two ways. Firstly, individuals valued 
losses more than they valued proportional gains. This behavior was termed “loss 
aversion.”  Secondly, individuals were risk-seeking in losses and risk-averse in gains. When 
combining these two factors a new utility function was proposed; there was a kink at the origin 
and the slope of the gain function was flatter than the loss function. Reference dependent 
preferences have been studied extensively within the lab (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler 
et al., 1997; Camerer et al., 1999); however, there has been a recent movement within economics 
research which aims to utilize field-based data rather than analyzing individuals in a lab setting 
(Bartling et al., 2014; Allen et al., 2015; Anbarci et al., 2017). It is important to note that the 
assessment of reference dependent preferences literature is more skewed towards the fields of 
finance and sport. This paper, in turn, followed this newly formed trend by exploring prospect 
theory using field data on DIII golfers. Moreover, existing literature has often either used field-
based data or behavioral oriented experiments, whereas this paper utilized both. The use of field-
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based data and an experiment would provide convincing support for this paper’s results, as the 
results were driven and concluded from two different empirical settings.  
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) utilized a field-based data to test for reference dependent 
preferences. The authors explained the equity premium puzzle, which is a long-standing financial 
anomaly, through the use of myopic loss aversion. The equity premium puzzle is the 
phenomenon that equities consistently outperform fixed income instruments, namely government 
bonds. Siegel (1991,1992) showed that during the periods of 1871-1925 and 1926-1990 the real 
compound equity returns were 6.6% and 6.4% respectively. While returns for short-term 
government bonds for the same time periods were 3.1% and 0.5% respectively. Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) highlighted that stocks have outperformed bonds over the last century due to two 
factors. Firstly, investors are assumed to be loss averse. Secondly, investors tend to “evaluate 
their portfolios frequently” (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). They named the amalgamation of these 
two distinct factors “myopic loss aversion.” In simpler terms, investors are often worried about 
losses, and thus in order for them to invest in equities, investors demand higher return, in 
comparison to bonds, to justify holding equity positions. 
The presence of reference points across various settings has resulted in the formation of 
four main candidates for reference points. Firstly, existing literature has shown that reference 
points are related to status quo (Knetsch, 1989; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1998). Secondly, 
various pieces of literature within psychology argue that goals and aspirations can also serve as 
the reference point (Markel et al., 2015). Thirdly, some authors argue that social preferences act 
as a reference point. In this instance, individuals would compare their outcomes to others around 
them. Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) provided evidence for this type of reference point when 
showing that social comparisons affect the labor-supply decisions of women. More recently, 
expectations as reference points have been explored (Koszeki and Rabin, 2006; Ge, 2018). 
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3.2 Prospect Theory in Professional Sport	
Bartling et al. (2015) utilized professional soccer game data from 3,672 and 4,560 
matches from the German Bundesliga and English Premier League respectively. For each match, 
they have detailed minute-by-minute information on goals, cards and substitutions. The authors 
analyzed this data and showed that professional soccer players exhibit reference dependent 
behavior during matches. They found that if a team is behind the expected match outcome (e.g. a 
team who is expected to win is in fact losing or the match is tied), the players of this team were 
issued more red and yellow cards in comparison to games in which the team is not behind the 
expectation. This finding still holds when they controlled for the state of the match as well as for 
unobserved match and team-specific heterogeneity. According to their results, if a team within 
the German Bundesliga and British Premier League is behind its expected match outcome, the 
probability that a player of that team will receive a card in a given minute is increased by 20% 
and 30% respectively. Furthermore, the authors showed that coaches implemented significantly 
more offensive substitutions when their teams were behind the expected outcome. This paper 
adds to the literature in support of the claim that expectations can act as reference points, and 
thus people’s behavior depends on how a given outcome contrasts with this reference point. 
More specifically, this paper highlighted that when individuals in team sports were in the domain 
of losses, they altered their behavior and became more risk-seeking.  
Ge (2018) showed that the behavior of those watching a game was influenced by a 
professional team’s expectations relative to a game’s outcome. The author utilized a high-
frequency dataset on taxi rides in New York City to investigate how emotions due to sporting 
event outcomes affect passengers’ tipping behavior. He used pre-game betting odds to determine 
the expectations of the game outcomes, which acts as the reference point, and found that 
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passengers tend to tip more after unexpected close wins and tip less after unexpected close 
losses. Thus, there is an array of literature confirming the finding that expectations as references 
points influence behavior.  
There are three main limitations to Bartling’s et al. (2015) paper. The first limitation is 
formed due to the set-up of the empirical framework; the authors looked at the number of cards 
given to a team rather than specific individuals behavior. This could pose an issue as the players 
more aggressive attitude could be driven by “groupthink” rather than the reference point. The 
second limitation comes about because of data selection; the authors focused on the British 
Premier League and the German Bundesliga which are widely known as the most physically 
tough leagues in Europe (Hayes, 2013). In turn, there is a possibility that this paper’s conclusions 
cannot be applied to other leagues and poses issues when applied to other fields (e.g. golf). 
Thirdly, they did not control for “rivalries” amongst teams. For example, Chelsea FC and 
Arsenal FC are two teams located in London and thus have a city rivalry: The London Derby. In 
these games, players tend to play more aggressively, and so there is a possibility that the results 
could have been driven by various derby games rather than the entirety of the two leagues.  
The consistent takeaway from the two papers mentioned within this section is that 
reference dependence in sport is a worthy area of study as it not only dictates the behavior of the 
players themselves but also alters the behavior of those watching.   	
3.3 Prospect Theory in Individual Professional Sports  
Although Bartling et al. (2015) contribute to this papers research by highlighting the salient 
reference point of scores in sports, soccer is a team-based sport and so does not directly 
investigate individual player’s decision-making process. Focusing on individual sports rather 
than team sports may be less noisy in revealing reference points. This is due to the fact that team 
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sports provide a setting in which various reference points could be present, e.g. status quo of the 
team, thus making it difficult to identify the effect that one specific reference point may bring 
about. There is strong evidence that the individuality of certain sports provides a robust natural 
setting for investigating reference dependence. 
One paper which researched reference dependence in individual sports is Allen et al. 
(2015) in which the authors asked the following research question: do round numbers act as a 
reference point for marathon runners? The authors hypothesized that round number reference 
point serve as a discontinuity in a marathoner’s utility function. They used time target as a 
reference point because of two main reasons: it acts as an internal targeting system, and the 
absence of financial incentives for marathon runners makes runners intrinsically motivated. The 
absence of the financial incentives strengthens the hypothesis that runners are driven by their 
“personal best” or an internal system as opposed to receiving a monetary reward. The authors 
used the results posted on websites of individual marathons globally from 1970-2013 as their 
dataset. The sample is 873,000 runners with an average finishing time for a full marathon of 4 
hours and 41 minutes.  They measured the amount of excess mass, higher density of running 
times in comparison to other numbers, around round numbers and tested whether the excess 
mass is statistically significant in an interval around a round number. The main finding was the 
existence of bunches when approaching round numbers; they found that 50.1% more runners 
finished within a minute before 3 hours than a minute after. Furthermore, they found the 
presence of left-digit bias for finishing times. Lastly, they concluded that round number 
reference points served as points of discontinuity in a runner’s utility function.  The main 
limitation of this study stems from the fact that there could be other reference points that 
marathon runner utilize when running a race, rather than solely round number finishing times. 
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The presence of pacesetters, personal best times and last race times could dampen the impact of 
round number reference.  
Allen et al. (2015) are pioneers in the use of the nonparametric procedures in reference 
dependence analysis. Although the authors hypothesized the presence of a reference point of 
whole numbers before their analysis, they did not empirically estimate the reference point, rather 
the reference point “pops out” in the distribution of the data. Allen et al. (2015) actively 
contributes to our research through a variety of ways. As opposed to other literature, Allen et al. 
(2015) investigated reference dependence in an individual sport which lacks financial incentives, 
similarly to amateur golf. This paper provides empirical evidence for the impact of reference 
dependence on a runner’s performance close to the reference point thus providing evidence that 
players are strongly influenced by reference dependence. Furthermore, this paper’s study design, 
one which allows the data to dictate the reference point rather than choosing a specific reference 
point prior to analysis, is heavily based on the study design of Allen et al. (2015). 	
According to the PGA, five sports resemble a similar “mental and physical” approach to 
that of golf; the closest being tennis (PGA Tour, 2010). Anbarci et al. (2017) searched for similar 
behavioral anomalies in professional tennis. More specifically, they tackled the question: are 
professional tennis players loss averse? The authors used a self-generated dataset, that consisted 
of 32 matches of the Dubai Duty Free Tennis Championship in 2013, for which the Hawk-Eye 
technology was available.4 They found that loss aversion was visible in three different settings. 
Firstly, when professional tennis players were behind in score, e.g. 0 - 40 down, they were more 
likely to take risks by increasing their serve speed. Serving with a higher speed can be viewed as 
a riskier strategy because as a player’s serve speed increases their accuracy decreases and thus 
                                               
4 Hawk-Eye is computer system used in various sports to measure the trajectory, speed and placement of the ball. 
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the probability that the serve will hit its desired target falls. Secondly, players were more willing 
to take risks when the stakes were high (Anbarci et al., 2017). This was seen when average serve 
speeds were lower earlier in the tournament in comparison to average serve speeds in the final. 
The final is the part of the tournament with the highest stakes as the monetary gain from winning 
this particular match is the greatest compared to any other match during the event. Thirdly, they 
discovered that risk taking behavior is greater amongst lower ranked players. This was shown by 
the fact that as a players ATP ranking lowered the effect on serve speed increased. They found 
that lower ranked player serve statistically significantly faster on average. In contrast to what the 
PGA believes, that golf and tennis are somewhat similar, the authors highlighted that tennis and 
golf are different in their competitive nature. This is due to the fact that in tennis the game is 
played one on one whereas in golf players compete against the whole field. Thus, although this 
paper provides a baseline belief regarding individual sports, there remains the uncertainty of the 
ability to generalize their findings onto reference dependence in golf. 		
3.4 Prospect Theory in Professional Golf	
Pope and Schwitzer (2011) analyzed the prospect theory framework on PGA tour 
professionals. Their study was testing whether or not professional golfers on the PGA tour acted 
in a loss averse manner. They used the dataset of putts per hole relative to the golfers’ score 
(“under par” or “over par”). The authors used a probit model which assessed the likelihood of 
making/missing a putt for eagle, birdie, par, bogey, and so on.5 
There were two main findings in this paper: there existed a reference point of “par of the 
current hole” for golfers on the PGA tour, and golfers exhibited loss aversion. The authors found 
                                               
5 Eagle: is a score of two strokes under par on a given hole; Birdie: is a score of one stoke under par on a given hole; 
Par: is a score equal to the par on a given hole; Bogey: is a score of one stroke over the par on a given hole. 
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evidence for reference dependent preferences and its influence on performance; they found that 
when at an equal distance from a hole, a golfer is 2% less likely to make a one under putt than 
making a par putt. This can be explained using reference dependence: golfers care more about 
making par than they do about making under par since par acts as their reference point and thus 
are more likely to make par than one under par.  Furthermore, there was evidence of loss 
aversion as golfers invest more focus when they are over par, the domain of losses, in 
comparison to under par, the domain of gains. Lastly, golfers behaved in a risk-averse manner in 
which they sacrifice success when putting for one under par to avoid hard, i.e., long distance, 
follow-up putts. In simple terms, the researchers’ analysis showed that golfers avoid the 
possibility of loss by playing conservatively when they have the opportunity to do better than 
par, but will try harder if they are at risk of receiving a score worse than par. This was the first 
paper written on reference dependent preferences within golf; however, there is a key limitation. 
The authors did not control for extraneous variables that could have significantly impacted a 
golfer’s score such as weather or golf course design. 	
However, Elmore and Urbaczewski (2019) showed that when golf course design is not 
altered, and purely the par of the hole is changed, professional golfers alter their decision 
making. Elmore and Urbaczewski (2019) investigated how prospect theory applies to decision 
making and performance in certain U.S. Opens. Elmore and Urbaczewski (2019) hypothesized 
that there is a psychological effect generated on a professional golfer “by labeling a hole as a par 
3, 4 or 5” (Elmore and Urbaczewski, 2019). Under standard theory, altering the par of the hole, 
while keeping the distance and design of the hole constant, should not impact a golfer’s score on 
the hole. From 1927 to 2016 the US Opens was held 14 times at two courses: Pebble Beach and 
Oakmont. During this period, the second hole at Pebble Beach and the ninth hole at Oakmont 
were moved from par 5’s to par 4’s, whilst only making slight changes to holes length to adjust 
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the movement of the tee markers and flag. The alteration of the par of these two holes provided 
an ideal natural setting to test for loss aversion and answered the question that previously stood: 
whether or not it was extraneous variables that were dictating decision making.  After obtaining 
scores from the United States Golf Association (USGA) shot by every professional golfer in 
these specific U.S. Opens they found U.S. Open golfers tend to put more effort into playing a 
hole rated a par 4 than a comparable hole rated a par 5. Using a linear regression model that 
included tournament fixed effects, they estimated that the loss aversion effect size was between 
0.22 and 0.31 strokes. In simple terms, one would expect a professional golfer playing a hole as a 
par 5 to score between 0.22 and 0.31 strokes higher than when the same hole is rated a par 4. 
Thus, players seem to exert more effort when the hole is playing at a more difficult rating. This is 
a significant impact, as highlighted by the authors, because tournaments on the PGA tour are 
played over 4 rounds and thus the impact of the result grows to over one stroke, which is often 
the difference between first and second place. 
From the two papers reviewed under this subsection it is clear that professional golfers 
are often influenced by reference dependent preferences; however, to what extent is this the 
dominant theory that is dictating their behavior? Arkes and Stone (2015) studied prospect theory 
predictions for three reference points: par for recent holes, par for the round, and par for the 
tournament. They asked the research question of: do hot hand effects dominate prospect theory 
effects for each reference point? They contributed to previous literature by exploring multiple 
reference points and investigated whether momentum dominates prospect theory or vice versa. 
The authors used the PGA ShortLink database: a public database which contains information on 
every shot at PGA tournaments from 2003-2015 excluding the four major tournaments. The 
authors conducted a linear regression with the following dependent variables: score from the last 
round above and below par, score from the current round above and below par, score for current 
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tournament above and below par, and score from the current hole above and below par, and the 
independent variable is predicted score.	
The main findings were that when in the domain of gains, prospect theory effects 
dominate hot hand effects: “recent success predicts a decline in quality of subsequent 
performance” (Arkes and Stone 2015). This is observed through greater conservatism with shots 
when scores are just below the reference point of par in order to maintain their scores, and less 
exerted effort since golfers care more about the reference point than the overall score. 
Alternatively, when scores are over par, there was evidence for diminishing sensitivity, as the 
further a golfers score is from the reference point the more risk-seeking the golfer is with their 
shots.  They also found evidence that the reference points golfers used were influenced by both 
salience and expectations: “that players adjust expectations, and thus reference points, based on 
their own overall ability, how a play is going in a particular round, and the difficulty of the 
relevant holes” (Arkes and Stone 2015). The limitation of this paper, similarly to Pope and 
Schweitzer (2011), is the inability to control for extraneous variables such as weather and golf 
course design. 	
The previous three papers are instrumental for this paper; the common finding that there 
exists a reference point for professional golfers, which in turn impacts a professional golfer’s 
decision-making, is the basis of this paper’s hypothesis and research idea. However, there is a 
question that still remains: are all golfers decision making dictated by reference dependent 
preferences? What previous literature lacks which this paper hopes to bridge is the impact of 
reference dependence on amateur players as opposed to solely professional golfers.  			
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3.5 Difference Between Professionals and Amateurs	
Melton and Zorn (2000) found that the level and structure of the prize money in golf 
tournaments positively impacted professional golfer’s performance. The authors collected data 
from the Official 1995 PGA Tour Media guide where results for the forty PGA tournaments 
played throughout the 1995 season are presented. The authors found that after the first two 
rounds of a tournament, golfers at the bottom of the leaderboard were willing to take on more 
risk than golfers at the top of the leaderboard. They argued that this is due to the fact that players 
at the bottom of the leaderboard were trying “to play catch up” (Melton and Zorn, 2000). This is 
due to the nonlinear reward system in PGA tour events (Adler et al., 2012). For example, the 
difference in rewards between first and second place is much larger than the difference in 
rewards between 36th and 37th place (Adler et al., 2012).  	
However, Adler et al. (2012) argued that this result could as easily be explained through 
risk asymmetry. In order to test this hypothesis, the authors examined whether recreational 
golfers would prefer to take greater risk when faced with likely losses than with likely gains, 
using par of the hole as a reference point. Their data set included responses from over 2100 
active recreational golfer who were participants in a national panel. Their main finding was 
recreational golfers were more willing to accept risk when facing a sure bogey (45% chose the 
risky option) than a sure birdie (28% chose the risky option). This result is consistent with 
previous findings; golfers were risk seeking when in the domain of losses and risk averse in the 
domain of gains. Both sets of authors present logical arguments as to which theory influences 
golfers performance on a given hole; however, one set of authors used a sample of professional 
golfers and the other set of authors used a sample of amateurs golfers and thus trying to place 
Melton and Zorns’ (2000) conclusions onto Adler et al.s’ (2012) sample or vice versa would 
create some level of bias.  
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There is a plethora of research surrounding the question as to whether or not college 
athletes should receive financial rewards whilst in tertiary education (Parent, 2004; Sanderson 
and Siegfried, 2015). However, this research would not be relevant to this study. What is 
relevant is whether or not the lack of financial incentives influences amateur athletes’ 
performance. Levitt et al. (2016) found that financial rewards improved academic performance 
among adolescents. Furthermore, Arbetron et al. (2005) found that financial incentives could 
increase program participation in after school clubs. Thus, it is clear that financial incentives 
have some level of impact on nonprofessionals. However, it is important to note that for both 
Levitt et al. (2016) and Arbetron et al. (2005), the samples were not specifically athletes. Thus, 
from the research provided in this section one could draw the conclusion that due to a lack of 
financial incentives amateur athletes will perform worse in comparison to professional athletes. 
This highlights a key issue with Adler et al,s’ (2012) study design when the authors analyzed the 
risk behavior of recreational gofers as they used par as the reference point, which is a reference 
point that both Arkes and Stone (2015) and Pope and Schwitzer (2011) highlighted was specific 
to professional golfers. I hypothesized that due to a lack of financial incentives and a lower 
quality of play, amateur golfers, more specifically DIII college golfers, would have a reference 
point above par. 
The reason as to why I chose to study DIII athletes over DI or DII athletes is due to the 
fact that DI and DII athletes have the possibility of receiving financial rewards in the future if 
they eventually turn professional. For many athletes, the idea they will one day play at the 
professional level is a seed that is planted long before they’re even approached by colleges, said 
Gershon Tenenbaum, a sports psychology professor at Florida State University. This can be seen 
in  a study conducted by the NCAA in 2015, which shows that 76% of NCAA Men's DI 
basketball players believe they will play professional basketball (New, 2015). However, in 
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reality only 1.2% of these individuals will in fact turn professional, based on previous years 
statistics. Even though the probability that a DI athlete will eventually compete at a professional 
level is low, DI athletes still have a strong belief that they will. According to data from the 2017 
NFL draft, 247 DI and 6 DII college football players were drafted into the NFL (NCAA, 2018). 
Moreover, according to data from the MLS SuperDraft in 2017, 78 male soccer players were 
drafted from NCAA colleges; 76 DI and 2 DII male soccer players. (NCAA, 2018) Thus, it is 
clear that DI and DII athletes have the possibility of competing at a professional level, which 
could be the factor that influences their decision making rather than being dictated by reference 
dependent preferences. In conclusion, DIII provides a suitable natural setting, due to a lack of 
financial incentives and almost negligible probability of turning professional, to analyze 
reference dependent preferences. 
 
3.6 Contributions to Existing Prospect Theory Literature 
Previous literature found that some clear quantity (purchase price in Shefrin and Statman, 
1985; round numbers in Allen et al., 2015) serve as reference points. My paper expands previous 
literature on reference dependence by proposing and examining a reference point that is not 
based on rational expectations and is endogenous to the economic agent (similar to Allen et al., 
2015). Furthermore, previous literature has examined reference dependence amongst 
professional athletes; however, this paper utilized a new empirical setting, DIII college golf, and 
thus adds to existing literature by investigating amateur rather than professional athletes.  
As previously mentioned, there have been numerous papers that have highlighted that par in 
various settings acts as reference points for professional golfers (Adler et al., 2012; Pope and 
Schweitzer, 2011; Stone and Arkes, 2016); thus, this paper adds to the literature by highlighting 
an alternative reference point, the number 80, to that of par within the setting of golf. 
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4.0 Methodology and Data 
This section is broken up into 4 distinct segments. The first focuses on the field dataset of 
DIII college tournament scores to identify a clear reference point number, this information is 
displayed in sections 4.1 and 4.11. The second focuses on a behavioral experiment I conducted to 
test for loss aversion, this information is displayed in sections 4.2, 4.21 and 4.22. The third 
focuses on a linear regression model that analyzed the impact that a reference point has on golf 
performance variables, this information is displayed in section 4.3. The fourth focuses on a 
probabilistic regression model that analyzed the impact that certain reference scores had on the 
likelihood of shooting specific tournament scores, this information is displayed in sections 4.4 
and 4.41.  
 
4.1 Field Data – Institutional Setting 
Golf is played over the duration of 18 holes in which a golf ball is struck with a club. The 
object is to use the fewest possible strokes to complete the course. 361 DIII golf tournaments 
were held in the U.S. during the Fall 2016 – Spring 2017 season. College golfers are a subset of a 
larger collection of indivuals termed “student-athletes.” A student-athlete is a participant in an 
organized competitive sport sponsored by an educational institution in which the student is 
enrolled. The term “student-athlete” was produced in 1964 by Walter Byers, the first-ever 
executive director of the NCAA, to counter attempts to require universities to pay worker’s 
compensation to athletes. A key difference between professional and college golfers is the 
absence of financial rewards for college golfers. DI and DII athletes do not receive financial 
compensation packages for playing a varsity sport in college. However, colleges within DI and 
DII offer athletic scholarships in various sports across the board. Thus, despite the absence of 
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formalized salaries, there are financial gains, athletics scholarships, in DI and DII where as there 
are no financial incentives to play a DIII varsity sport.  
Financial rewards are often explored as reference points within existing literature (Abeler 
et al., 2011). Despite the lack of financial incentives in DIII golf, there are various other 
reference points that a college golfer may use when evaluating his tournament performance. For 
example, it is reasonable to assume that a golfer may compare his tournament score to the 
tournament score of a fellow teammate or possibly the average score of individuals competing 
within the tournament. I hypothesized that the tournament score of 80 serves as a reference point 
for DIII college golfers. This hypothesis is driven by the fact that multiples of ten which are 
larger than sixty are widely referred to as reference points as derived from anecdotal research. 
The validity of the use of anecdotal research to find reference points was highlighted by Allen et 
al. (2015), where the authors used personal interviews with marathon runners to initially identify 
round numbers finishing times as possible reference points for marathon runners.  
 
4.11 Field Data – Overview 
There are no centralized publicly available datasets of tournament scores for DIII college 
golfers. Currently, Golfstat.com serves as the official scorer for all NCAA golf championships 
and provides free tournament software for college golf tournaments. Therefore, in order to 
conduct this research I generated a dataset by manually extracting tournament results PDF’s for 
the Fall 2016 – Spring 2017 season from Golfstat.com.6 
I used the Cisdem PDF tool to convert 126 tournament PDFs into excel form. I then 
manually cleaned the data to form a centralized dataset of DIII tournament scores. For this study, 
                                               
6 Golf is different from many other NCAA sports by having its season split between both the fall and spring, for 
example NCAA soccer is only played within the fall.  
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I want to examine reference dependent preferences amongst DIII male college golfers 
specifically, therefore I only included tournaments hosted by a DIII men’s team. The final 
dataset contains 6,543 tournament round scores. It is important to note that, DIII college golf 
tournaments are either broken up into 1, 2 or 3 rounds. The summary statistics for DIII 
tournament scores are provided in Table 1 within the Appendix. According to Table 1, round 1 
had the highest average tournament score of 82.35, whereas round 3 had the lowest scoring 
average of 77.89. Thus, scoring average fell as players within the sample progressed into further 
rounds. This insight hints towards the idea that golfers learn information when they play a golf 
course, then adjust accordingly in order to shoot a lower score. As highlighted in section 4.1, this 
data set was used to identify bunches around numbers in the DIII tournament score distribution.  
 
4.2  Behavioral Experiment – Overview 
All experimental work for this project was conducted online through the use of Qualtrics, 
an online survey platform.7 Participants were asked three sets of questions. First, participants 
were asked to answer a few questions about demographic characteristics including identification 
information such as their name, age and college of origin. The purpose of collecting 
identification information is to be able to match a participants answers from the survey with his 
individual tournament score from the generated dataset.  
Within the second section of the survey, participants were asked situational golf 
questions. The purpose of these questions was to test the risk tolerance of DIII college golfers 
and to test for loss aversion. The participants were asked six specific questions broken into two 
subgroups. The first subgroup included three questions that asked golfers what they would do 
when utilizing par as a reference point. The second subgroup included three questions that were 
                                               
7 This experiment was conducted in March 2019 and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Skidmore 
College. 
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only presented to participants if they answered “yes” to the question: “When competing in a golf 
tournament, do you have a score in mind that you want to beat?” These three questions are the 
same as the previous three questions. However, instead of utilizing par as a reference point, these 
questions allow the participant to select their own reference point. This is done through asking 
the participant the question: “What is this score that you want to beat?” the number they select 
here was utilized as the new reference point.  
Finally, in the last section of the survey, participants were asked questions about their 
performance during the Fall 2018 season. These questions were utilized to conduct a regression 
analysis to see the impact that the presence of a reference point has on a golfers’ performance 
variables. 
 
4.21  Behavioral Experiment – Participant Recruitment  
In order to recruit participants, I individually reached out to 10 DIII college golf coaches. 
In my email I asked whether they would be willing to forward the description of my online “golf 
skill analysis” study to their respective players. This accounted for approximately 100 DIII 
college male golfers. The response rate was in turn 51%, for a total of 51 participants. Prior to 
the survey, participants provided informed consent. Participants were not given any 
compensation for their participation in this study, and were not aware of the main objective of 
the study.  
The typical participant was a 20 year-old male who played an average of approximately 4 
tournament rounds in the Fall 2018 season. Golfers within this study are more involved in the 
game of golf in comparison to your “regular golfer.” The stroke average of a regular golfer is 
approximately 85.0 whereas the stroke average of my sample was approximately 77.59. Thus, 
my sample represents a group of players who are active within and knowledgeable about the 
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game of golf. Furthermore, Table 2 highlights the fact that the average reference score for this 
sample was 76.96. Thus, both the average reference score and stroke average of this sample were 
3 shots below my hypothesized reference point of 80. Furthermore, in support of my hypothesis, 
over half (54.9%) of the sample stated that they have a reference score that they aim to beat 
during tournament play. Thus, it seems as if DIII college golfers both aim and have the 
capabilities to shoot tournament round scores that are below the number 80.   
 
4.22  Behavioral Experiment – Experimental Procedure 
 The first page of the survey gave a description of the experiment including information 
on the procedures, risks, duration and purpose of the study. However, I did not share the main 
objective of the study in order to avoid potential bias. Moreover, I gave individuals the 
opportunity to exit the study if they did not wish to participate. Individuals who provided 
informed consent were included within the sample.  
 To ensure that participants were paying attention and providing accurate responses two 
quality control measures were embedded in the survey. The first quality control measure was a 
question that asked indivuals to slide a bar to the right. Individuals who did not attempt to slide 
the bar to the right were removed from the sample. The second quality control measure was an 
accuracy cross checker question which was included to ensure that the golf performance 
statistics were accurate. Participants were asked what their respective stroke average was, I then 
cross checked if this value was correct based on scoring statistics provided by the respective 
teams websites. Thus, it is within reason to believe that participants who answered truthfully 
regarding their stroke average, as determined by the cross-check, were truthful throughout the 
survey. Thus quality control measure ensures honesty in answers and thus increases the 
reliability of the data.  
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It is important to note that this experiment is similar to that of Adler et al. (2012) as it 
utilizes par as a reference point. However, I hypothesize that there is a reference point other than 
par for DIII college golfers. Thus, as previously mentioned, I asked individuals whether they 
have a score in mind when competing in tournament play; 54.9% answered “yes” to this 
question. Following this question, I ask the same golf scenario questions but instead of using par 
as the reference point, I allowed participants to use their own self-selected reference point. The 
summary of responses to the golf scenario questions are displayed in Table 3 within the 
Appendix.  
Furthermore, a graphical representation of the risky options chosen are displayed in 
Figure 3. It is noteworthy that the risk-taking in the scenario questions, taken from Adler et al 
(2012), result in a lower expected value than taking the “sure thing.”  
Upon the completion of the study, participants’ answers were used in conjunction with 
Fall 2018 scoring data to form a regression model that analyzed the impact of a reference point 
on a college golfers’ golf performance variables. 
 
4.30 Behavioral Experiment and Field Data – Regression Model 
The model used in this paper is similar to that produced by Moy and Liaw (1981) and 
Shmanske (2000); however, differs in that the dependent variable in their regressions were yearly 
earnings in dollar terms. Whereas, this paper utilized a model that has stroke average, (𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒), 
as the dependent variable. An linear regression model was used as the dependent variable is a 
continuous variable. The independent variables used within this regression are described below. 
The independent variables included long game measures (𝑑𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦, 𝑑𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
and 𝐺𝐼𝑅), short game measures (𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑠), an experience factor (𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) and 
control variables for the number of events played during the year, the age of a DIII college golfer 
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and the risk tolerance of a DIII college golfer (𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠,	𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘	𝑡𝑜𝑙). The main variable of 
interest is the reference point dummy (𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡). The regression model is presented below: 
 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒! = 𝛽"+	b#𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦! +	b$𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒! + b%	𝐺𝐼𝑅! +
b&	𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔! +	b'𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑠! +	b(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟! +	b)𝑎𝑔𝑒! + b*𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡! +
b+𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠! + b#"𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛! +	b##𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠! +	b#$𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘	𝑡𝑜𝑙! +	e!  
 
These skill statistics and experience variables have a direct impact on a golfers 
performance and a more detailed clarification of RHS variables are given below and in Tables 6, 
7 and 8 within the Appendix. The summary statistics for variables presented is given in Table 2. 𝑑𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦. This variable measures the percentage of tee shots that come to rest 
in the fairway by a DIII male college golfer. It is expected that this coefficient will be negative 
because a player that is more accurate will have a better opportunity, and thus a higher chance, to 
shoot lower scores. 𝑑𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒. This variable measures the average number of yards per drive by a 
DIII male college golfer. It is expected that this coefficient will be negative because a farther 
drive leaves a golfer closer to the hole, thus making the next shot easier resulting in a lower score 
on a given hole and in turn a lower scoring average.  𝐺𝐼𝑅. This variable measures the percentage of greens hit in regulation by a college golfer 
on average per round. A green is considered hit in regulation if any portion of the ball is touching 
the putting surface after the green in regulation stroke has been taken.8 It is expected that this 
                                               
8 The green in regulation stroke is determined by subtracting 2 from par; 1st stroke on a par 3, 2nd stoke on a par 4, 
3rd stoke on a par 5. 
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coefficient will be negative because a player that has a higher GIR value hits more greens thus 
providing more opportunities to putt for birdie and in turn shoot lower scores.  𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔. This variable measures the percentage of time a DIII male college golfer 
misses a GIR, but still manages to make par or better.   𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑠. This variable is used to define the number of putts a college golfer hits on average 
per round. It is expected that this coefficient will be positive because there is a perfectly linear 
relationship between a tournament round score and number of putts; as a player hits more putts 
their scoring average will rise.  𝑎𝑔𝑒. This variable is age of the player, measured in years. 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡. This dummy variable is used to explain whether the presence of a reference 
point influences a golfers average score. This dummy variable equals one if a participant 
answered yes to the question “When competing in a golf tournament, is there a score that you 
want to ensure you beat?” The impact of a reference point on a amateur golfers stroke average is 
ambiguous; however, it is expected that this coefficient will in fact be positive as  𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛. This dummy variable equals one if a participant is a freshman. I use this 
variable to control for the variation in average scores that might be generated by being freshman 
relative to other class years. This variation could arise due to two key reasons. Firstly, college 
golf is significantly different to high school golf and thus freshmen often take time to adjust to 
these changes which often negatively impacts tournament golf performance. Jaki Hitzelberger, a 
certified mental game coaching professional, wrote that freshman athletes often struggle to 
perform due to “an inability to cope with mental challenges they face during their first year” 
(Hitzelberger, 2014).  Secondly, college golf teams very often play the same tournaments, and 
thus the same golf courses, year over year, and thus a freshman is at an automatic disadvantage 
due to the fact that they have never played these events or played these courses before.  
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𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠. This variable measures the number of tournament events a DIII male college 
golfer played in the Fall 2018 season. It is expected that this coefficient will be negative as a 
player gains experience with every additional event played and thus improving their respective 
scoring average.  𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠. This variable measures the number of years a participant has been in 
college and  is an experience control variable. This variable is expected to have a positive sign 
because, as mentioned previously, college golf teams often play the same events and courses 
year over year; providing upperclassmen an advantage of course knowledge. This knowledge 
would allow players to perform better and thus causing stroke average to fall.  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘	𝑡𝑜𝑙. This dummy variable equals one if a participant answered “$9 for sure” to the 
question “What would you rather do.” This question is a lottery based question to test to risk 
tolerance of a DIII college golfer.  
The model presented before will be used in part three of my analysis to conduct Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regressions. The OLS regressions will be used to analyze the impact created 
by a reference point on 56 DIII college golfers scoring average.  
 
4.4 Panel Data – Overview 
 The panel dataset was formed by focusing on the sample of participants that stated that 
they do have a reference score. The summary statistics for this sample are shown in Table 9. 
Interestingly, the average score of this sample included within the panel dataset was 77.49, 
approximately 3.5 shots lower than the field data sample used within section 4.1 of this paper. 
Furthermore, the average score of this sample is a mere 2.5 shots lower than my hypothesized 
reference point of 80, and 70.3% of this sample shot tournament round scores below 80. The 
average reference score of this sample was 76.19, which is below the hypothesized reference 
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score of 80, and ranged between values of  70 to 85. In support of my hypothesis, 97.1% of the 
sample had a reference score that was below or equal to 80. Thus, before running the 
probabilistic linear regression models, and purely looking at the summary statistics of this 
sample, it seems as if DIII college golfers both aim and have the capabilities to shoot tournament 
round scores that are better (lower) than the number 80.   
 
4.41 Panel Data – Probability Model 
4 Probabilistic regression models were proposed in this paper which analyzed the 
manually formed panel dataset. The motivation behind utilizing probabilistic regression models 
stems from the fact that an abundance of literature centered on reference dependence within 
sports has utilized probability models in order to determine the impact that a reference point 
creates (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011). For example, as previously highlighted, Pope and 
Schweitzer (2011) found that when at an equal distance from a hole, a PGA professional golfer is 
2% more likely to make a putt for par in comparison to making a putt for birdie. The 4 
probabilistic regression models used within this paper are listed below: 
 Pr(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80!) = 	𝜙(𝛽" + 𝛽#𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80! + 𝛽$𝑋(𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!)) – (1) Pr(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80!) = 	𝜙(𝛽" + 𝛽#𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙	80! + 𝛽$𝑋(𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!)) – (2) Pr(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80!) = 	𝜙(𝛽" + 𝛽#𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	75! + 𝛽$𝑋(𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!)) – (3) Pr(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	75!) = 	𝜙(𝛽" + 𝛽#𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	75! + 𝛽$𝑋(𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!)) – (4) 
 
The dependent variables used in these models are 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80! and 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	75!. 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80! is equal to 1 if a player shoots a tournament round score 
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under 80 and 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	75! is equal to 1 if a player shoots a tournament round score under 
75. These two dummy variables are categorized as tournament score variables.  
The independent variables included in all 4 models can be broken up into two sub-
groups: reference score dummy variables and tournament control variables. The reference score 
dummy variables included in the models are: 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80!, 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙	80! and 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	75!. The reference score dummy variables are described below: 
The dummy variable 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80! is equal to 1 if a player has a reference score of 80 
or below. The dummy variable 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙	80! is equal to 1 if a player has a reference score of 
exactly 80. The dummy variable 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	75! is equal to 1 if a player has a reference score of 
75 or below.  
The tournament control variables included in the models are: 𝑝𝑎𝑟!, 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑!, 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ! and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟_2018!. The tournament control variables are described below: 𝑝𝑎𝑟!. This variable controls for the par rating of the course. Values range between 70 and 
73. It was expected that the sign of this variable’s coefficient would be negative because as the 
par of the course decreases a shot cushion is formed increasing the likelihood of shooting a lower 
score.9  𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑!. This variable controls for the tournament round in which a score was shot. 
College golf tournaments are generally played over 1, 2 or 3 rounds. Thus, as shown in Table 9, 
the minimum and maximum values for this variable are 1 and 3 respectively. It was expected that 
the sign of this variable’s coefficient would be positive. This is because as the number of rounds 
in a tournament increases, a player is given the opportunity to become more accustomed to the 
                                               
9 Consider a player whose goal is to shoot 80. On a par-72 course, shooting a score of 80 is equivalent to shooting a 
score of 8-over par. Whereas, on a par-70 course, shooting a score of 80 is equivalent to shooting a score of 10-over 
par. Thus, playing a par-70 course rather than a par-72 course gives a player a 2 shot cushion making it easier and in 
turn increasing the likelihood of shooting a score under 80. 
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golf course layout and thus alter strategy according and in turn increase the likely hood of 
shooting lower tournament scores. 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ!. This variable controls for the length of the course played during a tournament. 
Values range between 6,063 yards and 7,156 yards.  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟_2018!. This dummy variable controls for the year in which the tournament was 
held equals 1 if the tournament was held in 2018 and 0 if the tournament was held in 2019. It 
was expected that the sign of this variable’s coefficient would be positive. This is because the 
panel data used was from just one season, Fall 2018 – Spring 2019. If the tournament was held in 
2018, it would mean that the tournament was played during the Fall half season which tends to 
have better weather conditions in comparison to the Spring half season. Playing in the Fall would 
increase the likely hood of shooting better scores as the weather conditions are easier to play in.10 
Equation (1), (2) and (3) analyzed whether having a reference score of 80 or below, 
exactly 80 and 75 or below impacted the likelihood of shooting a tournament round score below 
80, respectively. Equation (4) analyzed whether having a reference score of 75 or under impacted 
the likelihood of shooting a tournament round score of under 75. Equation (4) was included to 
assess whether there was difference between the likelihood of shooting a tournament round score 
below 80, with a reference score of 80 or below, in comparison to the likelihood of shooting a 
tournament round score below 75, with a reference score of 75 or below.  
 
 
                                               
10 Majority of players within the panel data set originate from colleges within the Northeast. The Fall half season 
conditions are easier to play in as the half season is played between the months of August and October. Whereas the 
Spring half season is played during the months of March to April; thus, conditions during this period have a 
tendency to be harder as it is still cold and wet. For example, the Liberty League, a DIII conference made up of 
college teams from the Northeast, holds two tournaments at the Kaluhyat golf course in the Fall and Spring. The 
round 2 average score of the Spring event was 4.68 shots higher in comparison to the round 2 average score of the 
Fall event.  
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5.0 Results 
5.1 Identifying the Reference Point 
 Figure 2 demonstrates the distribution of tournament round scores for my full sample of 
DIII golfers. The individual bars show the frequency of scores between 69 and 90 for the Fall 
2016 – Spring 2017 season. I chose to limit the distribution to this window as 98.7% of total 
distribution lies within this window. We can conclude from Figure 2, that there is a large mass 
surrounding the number 80. This finding is reaffirmed by the fact that 16.0% and 12.5% of the 
distribution is accounted for between the numbers 78 to 79 and 81 to 82, respectively. Signs of 
loss aversion can be seen by the distribution because 28.1% more golfers shot 78 and 79 in 
comparison to 81 and 82. This fact highlights that many golfers seem to want to shoot lower than 
80 as a much larger percentage of golfers shot tournament round scores that are slightly lower 
than 80 (1 or 2 shots lower ) in comparison tournament round scores that are slightly higher than 
80 (1 or 2 shots higher). This is similar to Allen et al. (2015) finding when the authors found that 
50.1% more marathons runners finished within a minute before 3 hours than a minute after. The 
authors in turn concluded that marathon runners are in fact loss averse. 
 
5.2 Testing Risk Asymmetry and Loss Aversion 
Results from the behavioral experiment for the full sample are displayed in under the 
column “Par as a Reference Point: What Would You Rather Do?” These golfers were more 
willing to accept risk when faced with a sure bogey (46% chose the risky option) in comparison 
to a sure birdie (25% chose the risky option). However, the finding that golfers did not accept 
more risk when faced with a sure par (19% chose the risk option) in comparison to a sure birdie 
(25% chose the risky option) is inconsistent with my hypothesis. Results for the individuals that 
stated that they had a reference point score and selected their own reference point score are 
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displayed under the column “Self-Selected Reference Point: What Would You Rather Do?” 
These golfers were more willing to accept risk when faced with a sure bogey (29% chose the 
risky option) in comparison to a sure birdie (24% chose the risky option). The results from both 
samples of participants highlight that DIII college golfers are more risk seeking in a domain of 
losses in comparison to a domain of gains. This result reinforces the claim that DIII college 
golfers exhibit loss-aversive behavior which was made in section 5.1. The fact that  
 
5.3 Linear Regression Model 
 The results from the OLS estimates for the full sample are discussed below. Table 4 
shows the regression results of the model presented within the Methodology and Data section for 
the full sample of 51 participants (N=51).  
 My results, consistent within Moy and Liaw (1981) and Shmanske (2000), show that both 
greens in regulation and putts per round, 𝐺𝐼𝑅! and 𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑠!, were vital in determining a golfers 
overall performance. The coefficients of 𝐺𝐼𝑅! and 𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑠! were found to be -0.161 and 0.480 ad 
were statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively.. 𝐺𝐼𝑅! coefficient can be 
interpreted in the following way: if a golfer increases the average percentage of greens he hits in 
regulation by 1%, his stroke average will fall by 0.161 shots. 𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑠! coefficient can be 
interpreted in the following way: if a golfer increases the average number of putts he has per 
round by 1 putt, his stoke average will in turn increase by 0.48 shots. It is important to note that 
the coefficients for both 𝐺𝐼𝑅! and 𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑠! had signs consistent with expectations.  
However, driving statistics, 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦! and 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!, did not have 
signs that were consistent with expectations. In fact, 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒! was statistically 
insignificant. This provides support for the belief that golfers “drive for show and putt for doe.” 
In simpler terms, it is commonly thought that short game statistics such as putting and 
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scrambling are more important determinants of professional golf earnings in comparison to 
driving statistics. Thus, it seems as both GIR and putts are vital for both amateurs and 
professionals alike.  
 It is important to briefly discuss the performance variables’ results; however, my main 
variable of interest was the reference point dummy variable. This variable was in fact statistically 
insignificant. However, purely including the dummy within the model only shows whether a 
having a reference point in mind influences stroke average, yet my hypothesis is focused on an 
individuals’ score for a tournament round rather than a seasons’ stroke average. Thus, a new 
model was proposed that included various interaction terms which were formed by interacting all 
the independent variables with the reference point dummy. This was done in order to assess 
whether having a reference point impacts an individual’s golf performance variables. These 
results are shown in Table 5.11  
 The results were as follows: 2 of the interaction terms were statistically significant at a 
5% level. Firstly, the coefficient of 𝐺𝐼𝑅_𝑥_𝑟𝑒𝑓! was -0.229; which can be interpreted in the 
following way: when considering a college golfer who has a reference point in mind, if he 
increases the average number of greens he hits in regulation by 1% then his stroke average will 
in turn fall by 0.229 shots. Furthermore, if this same golfer increases his average GIR by 11%, 
this is equivalent to hitting approximately 2 more greens a round, his stroke average will fall by 
approximately 2.519 shots. This might seem like a small impact; however, it is in fact a sizable 
effect. To put this into perspective, currently the 65th ranked player in DIII has a stroke average 
of 75.240, if he decreased his stoke average by 2.519 shots he would be ranked within the top-10 
players in DIII. One shot is often the difference between winning and losing in golf. Secondly, 
the coefficient of 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑎𝑐𝑐_𝑥_𝑟𝑒𝑓! was 0.163; which means for a golfer who has a reference 
                                               
11 The coefficients of various interaction terms were dropped from the model due to collinearity.  
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point in mind, if he increase the average number of fairways he hits by 1% then his stroke 
average will in turn increase by 0.163 shots. This finding was inconsistent with predictions. 
 
5.4 Probabilistic Regression Model 
The results from the 4 probabilistic regression models for the sample of participants that 
stated they had a reference score is discussed below. Table 10 shows the results from the 4 
models with 273 observations (N=273).  
The results from Equation (1) showed that two of the control variables, 𝑝𝑎𝑟! and 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑!, 
and the dummy variable, 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80! , had statistically significant coefficients at the 10%, 
10% and 5% levels respectively. The variable of interest is 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	80! and the value of its 
coefficient was 0.427, which was the largest magnitude, and can be interpreted as the following: 
if a player has a reference score of 80 or below, he will be 42.7% more likely to shoot a 
tournament round score that is under 80.12 The magnitude of this result was relatively large in 
comparison to the magnitudes found in the three other models . For example, the median 
reference score was in fact 75, and Equation (4) utilized the median value to identify its impact 
on the likelihood of shooting a score under 75. The variable of interest for Equation (4) was 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	75! and the coefficient of 0.223 was statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
result can be interpreted as the following: if a player has a reference score of 75 and below, he 
will be 22.3% more likely to shoot a tournament round score under 75. Thus, the impact of 
having a reference score of 80 or under seems relatively large.  
However, this result does not reveal the impact of having a reference point of exactly 80. 
Thus, Equation (2) was included to assess whether or not having a reference score of 80 created 
downward or upward pressure on the likelihood of shooting a tournament score of under 80. The 
                                               
12 This could include scores such as 79, 78, 77, 76, etc.  
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coefficient for the independent variable of interest, 𝑟𝑒𝑓	𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙	80!, was positive suggesting 
upward pressure on the likelihood of shooting a score lower than 80, yet results were 
inconclusive as the coefficient was in fact statistically insignificant. This insignificant result 
could be driven by the fact that only 14.7% of the sample had a reference score of 80, which 
limits the sample size to a mere 44 observations (N=44).  
 
6.0 Discussion 
6.1 Alterative Explanations for Bunching around the Number 80 
My findings suggest that the tournament round score of 80 acts as a reference point for 
DIII college golfers. However, doubt surrounding the validity of my findings spurs from the idea 
that the number 80 reflects the capabilities of a DIII golfer rather than acting as a reference point. 
In contradiction to this belief, golfers, especially golfers of a weaker ability similar to that of 
DIII, can improve their scoring ability significantly with small modifications. Cantwell et al. 
(2008) utilized a sample of 32 male county level golfers and showed that if they utilized 
PETTLEP-based imagery, a simple mental adjustment in which a golfer attempts to visualize the 
shot they will hit, they improved their bunker play significantly (P < 0.01). This is just one 
example of a small modification that could result in a major change in a golfers ability to shoot 
better scores. Another alternative explanation for bunching around 80 could be left-digit bias 
(Anderson and Simester, 2003; Laceter et al., 2012). Left-digit bias is the inclination of indivuals 
to place more attention on the most left digits of numbers in comparison to the digits further to 
the right (Allen et al., 2015). This type of bias is often used to explain why consumer products 
are priced utilizing 99 cents rather than a whole number; for example, $4.00 versus $3.99. In the 
DIII college setting, if left-digit bias was present we would see large bunches surrounding 
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numbers such as 70 and 90. However, as shown in Figure 2, this results is not present within the 
sample.  
 
6.2 Alternative Explanation for Likelihood of Shooting a Score Below 80 
I found that DIII college golfers who have a reference score of 80 or below are 42.7% 
more likely to shoot a tournament round score below 80. The significant probabilistic result can 
be explained by loss aversion. Consider a golfer who has a reference score of 80 or below, he 
might exert more effort when approaching the over par equivalent of shooting 80, as he does not 
want to finish the tournament round with a score above 80, and in turn alters his strategy in order 
increase the likelihood of shooting a score under 80. However, to undeniably draw the 
relationship between loss aversion and this result hole by hole data would need to be utilized.  
A possible alternative explanation to that explained by prospect theory is: having a 
reference score of 80 or below could simply mean you are a better player, and thus shoot lower 
tournament scores, in comparison to those who have a reference score of above 80. If this claim 
was in fact true, individuals who have a reference score of 75 should be classified as better 
golfers in comparison to golfers with the reference score of 80.13 However, a comparison 
between the estimates from the probabilistic regression models (3) and (1), shown in section 5.4,  
provided evidence against this claim. A golfer who has a reference score of 75 and under 
(proposed better player) is 20.9% more likely to shoot a tournament score below 80. Whereas, a 
golfer who has a reference score of 80 and under (proposed worse player) a golfer is 48.2% more 
likely to shoot tournament scores of below 80. This results goes against standard economic 
                                               
13 This belief can be supported by the fact that college golfers’ performance during a season is solely based on the 
scores they shoot during college tournaments. For example, national ranking, and honors such as all DIII Ping All 
American status, in DIII golf is exclusively based on tournament stroke average. 
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theory as better quality players should have a higher likelihood of shooting tournament scores 
below 80. One could argue that the reference score of score of 75  
 
6.3 Explanation for Unexpected Risk Taking Behavior When Faced with a Sure Par  
As predicted, I found that DIII college golfers accept greater risk when they are faced 
with a sure bogey in comparison to when they are faced with a sure birdie. This finding is 
consistent with the reference dependent preferences model proposed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) in which individuals were risk-seeking in losses and risk-averse in gains. However, in 
contrast to my prediction, DIII college golfers did not accept less risk when they were faced with 
a sure birdie in comparison to when they were faced with a sure par. It is not clear why this 
occurred. Yet, these results are consistent with Adler et al. (2012), when the authors utilized a 
sample of recreational golfers. The Authors discussed the possibility that obtaining par may not 
be an “emotionally neutral event.” They argued that par could possibly act as a positive event 
rather than an a neutral event and thus golfers “would be less prone to take risk.” This could 
possibly act as an explanation of my inconsistent result; however, my sample of golfers do vary 
in comparison to the sample utilized by Adler et al. (2012) as their sample had an average 
handicap of 14, which is equivalent to a stroke average of 85, whereas my sample had a stroke 
average of approximately 77.59.   
 
6.4 Contributions to Prospect Theory Literature 
Previous literature found that some clear quantity (purchase price in Shefrin and Statman, 
1985; round numbers in Allen et al., 2015) serve as reference points. My paper expands previous 
literature on reference dependence by proposing and examining a reference point that is not 
based on rational expectations and is endogenous to the economic agent (similar to Allen et al., 
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2015). Furthermore, previous literature has examined reference dependence amongst 
professional athletes; however, this paper utilized a new empirical setting, DIII college golf, and 
thus adds to existing literature by investigating amateur rather than professional athletes.  
As previously mentioned, there have been numerous papers that have highlighted that par in 
various settings acts as reference points for professional golfers (Adler et al., 2012; Pope and 
Schweitzer, 2011; Stone and Arkes, 2016); thus, this paper adds to the literature by highlighting 
an alternative reference point, the number 80, to that of par within the setting of golf. 
 
6.5 Application in the World of Business 
There are no direct policy implications due to my study; however, the findings within this 
study could act as a positive resource for various stakeholders. Firstly, if a DIII college golfer 
wants to improve their stroke average they should focus more on golf skills such as putting and 
GIR rather than golf skills such as driving distance. Secondly, these findings could prove to be 
useful to organizations such as The First Tee. The First Tee is an international youth 
development organization that attempts to aid junior golfers to being recruited into the various 
divisions with the NCAA. The First Tee publishes a yearly journal which provides recruiting tips 
to junior golfers in hopes of assisting them in getting recruited. Thus, my study would prove to 
be useful as it would provide an insight into the capabilities and mindset needed in order to get 
recruited to play DIII golf. 
Furthermore, similar to Allen et al. (2015), the results from this paper highlighted that 
having a reference point significantly impacted the performance and decision making of 
individuals. Reference points are similar to intrinsic motivators in that they are internal goals that 
individuals either strive to attain or beat. Thus, one could argue that the results from this paper 
revealed the fact that intrinsic motivators do in fact influence the performance and decision 
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making of individuals. This is a vital finding as many companies have a tendency to try motivate 
workers with extrinsic motivators, such as financial incentives, rather than providing work 
environments that allow workers to achieve their internal goals. The latter could prove to be 
successful in hopes of motivating workers.  
 
6.5 Limitations of Findings  
Admittedly, there are a number of limitations to my study. Firstly, when I conducted the 
simplified bunching analysis, I only used data from the Fall 2016 – Spring 2017 season. This 
raises doubt about my results. There is a possibility that the concentration of the distribution 
around the tournament score of 80 was only present for the Fall 2016 – Spring 2017 season and 
disappears when analyzing data from other DIII golf seasons.  
Secondly, my behavioral experiment lacked a large sample size, N = 51, due to a 
relatively low response rate and time restrictions for data collection. Therefore, my study has 
potential for a type II error, accepting a non-true hypothesis. Secondly, within my various 
regression models, I was unable to control for weather and course design. This could be the 
reason as to why my 𝑅$ value was 0.789. However, this is an issue that various papers have 
faced and is thus a minor limitation in comparison to the others mentioned within this section. 
Thirdly, due to data restrictions I was not able to attain hole by hole data during 
tournament play of DIII golfers. This prevented me from truly assessing whether golfers adjust 
their strategy accordingly when faced with sure losses in comparison to sure gains. Nonetheless, 
The behavioral experiment I conducted attempted to fill this data gap by asking participants golf 
situational questions.  
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6.6 Further Areas of Study 
Due to the fact that reference dependence in amateur sports is an untouched field of 
study, this paper offers a gateway for numerous studies to follow. For example, analyzing 
college level tennis players rather than professional tennis players. Based on my findings, there 
are several possible extensions of my study. A basic extension is to examine reference 
dependence in DI or DII. A comparison of reference dependent preferences amongst DI  and 
DIII athletes would be an interesting study as it would either highlight or disprove the belief that 
DI athletes are of a significantly different caliber and thus act and think differently when faced 
with similar golf situations. 
 Secondly, similar to methodology used in Bartling et al. (2015), when the authors found 
that soccer players act more aggressively when behind the match expected outcome, utilizing 
hole by hole data would allow researchers to identify whether golfers alter their strategy during 
tournament play, when faced with sure losses (over par) in comparison to sure gains (under par), 
and thus effectively assess whether or not golfers exhibits loss-aversive behavior.  
 
7.0 Conclusion 
Unlike previous literature, my study examines whether the reference dependent model of 
preferences can explain the behavior of DIII college golfers, and further investigates the impact 
that a reference point has on commonly discussed golf performance variables.  In my study, I 
carry out a 3-part analysis utilizing DIII tournament score data for the Fall 2016 – Spring 2017 
season manually extracted from Golfstat.com and from a behavioral experiment analyzing the 
risk behavior of DIII college golfers (N = 51).  
When I analyzed the distribution of tournament scores, my results show that the 
tournament score of 80 acts as a reference point for DIII college golfers. This was shown by 
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utilizing a simplified method to that of Allen et al. (2015), highlighting that there was bunching 
surrounding the number 80. Furthermore, I found signs of loss aversion due to the fact that that 
28.1% more DIII golfers shoot scores within 2 shots less than 80 in comparison to 2 shots more 
than 80. The finding that DIII college golfers are in fact loss averse is further supported by the 
findings within the behavioral experiment. I found that golfers were more willing to accept risk 
when faced with a sure bogey (29% chose the risky option) in comparison to a sure birdie (24% 
chose the risky option). Thus, it is clear that the reference dependent preference model fits to the 
setting of DIII golf. However, the reference point is not only present within this setting, but also 
influences specific golf performance variables. My linear regression analysis shows that when a 
DIII college golfer has a reference point in mind, if they increase their greens in regulation (GIR) 
by 1% they will decrease their stroke average by approximately 0.229 shots. This is a large 
impact and could allow a DIII golfer to significantly impact their stroke average and thus 
improve their overall ability to shoot better scores. Furthermore, I found that if a DIII college 
golfer has a reference score of 80 or below the probability that he will shoot a score under 80 is 
in fact 42.7%. 
The overall takeaway of this study highlighted that PGA professionals are not the only 
stakeholders in golf who are influenced by reference points. When I merged the results of the 
four sections of my analysis, I concluded that the number 80 was in fact a reference point in DIII 
golf, and in turn has an impact on not only their decision making but also influences their overall 
golf performance. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1. Prospect theory value function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Retrieved from: Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263.  
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Figure 2. DIII College Tournament Scores Distribution 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Golfers who Chose the Risky Option  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for DIII Golf Tournament Scores 
    
 Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Round 1 Score 82.35 8.71 3857 
Round 2 Score 80.84 7.38 2309 
Round 3 Score 77.89 5.01 377 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for the full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
age 51 20.16 1.173 18 23 
reference_score 28 76.96 2.808 70 85 
number_tournaments 48 3.458 2.601 0 12 
stroke_average 44 77.59 2.949 72.58 84.62 
GIR 43 58.26 14.27 7 80 
driving_average 43 61.61 13.81 10 80 
driving_distance 44 277.6 17.72 210 315 
putts 44 31.73 2.234 26 36 
scrambling 44 45.31 17.11 3 70 
freshmen 51 0.196 0.401 0 1 
college_years 51 2.529 1.046 1 4 
risk_tol 51 0.392 0.493 0 1 
ref_point 51 0.549 0.503 0 1 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Percent of Participants Who Selected Each Option 
 51 
Choice Reference Point of Par: 
What Would You 
Rather Do?  
Self-Selected Reference 
Point: What Would You 
Rather Do?  
Domain: Gains 
  
I would rather take a sure birdie. Safe 75% Safe 76% 
Make a risky shot that would either 
end with eagle (30%) or par (70%). 
Risky 25% Risky 24% 
   
Domain: Neutral 
  
I would rather take a sure par. Safe 81% Safe 84% 
Make a risky shot that would either 
end with birdie (30%) or bogey 
(70%). 
Risky 19% Risky 16% 
Domain: Losses 
  
I would rather take a sure bogey. Safe 54% Safe 70% 
Make a risky shot that would either 
end with par (30%) or double bogey 
(70%). 
Risky 46% Risky 29% 
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Table 4. Full Sample Regression 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Stroke_average 
  
GIR -0.161*** 
 (0.040) 
driving_acc 0.072* 
 (0.039) 
driving_dist 0.014 
 (0.023) 
putts 0.480** 
 (0.202) 
scrambling 0.013 
 (0.026) 
freshmen 2.557* 
 (1.418) 
college_years -0.628 
 (0.869) 
age 0.830 
 (0.711) 
number_tournaments -0.592** 
 (0.265) 
risk_tol -0.688 
 (0.862) 
ref_point 1.020 
 (0.843) 
Constant 49.371*** 
 (13.706) 
  
Observations 37 
R-squared 0.632 
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Table 5. Regression with Interaction Terms 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Stroke_average 
GIR_x_ref -0.229** 
 (0.088) 
driving_acc_x_ref 0.163** 
 (0.063) 
scrambling_x_ref 0.049 
 (0.036) 
Constant 51.991** 
 (21.227) 
  
Observations 20 
R-squared 0.789 
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Table 6. Definition of player characteristics variables. 
Variable Definition   
freshmen Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a player is a freshman. 
age The age of the player, measured in years. The value is obtained from the online 
survey. 
college_years The number of years the player has been in college. 
events The number of tournament events the player participated within during the Fall 
2018 season.  
risk_tol Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a player is risk-seeking. 
 
Table 7. Definition of golf performance variables. 
Variable Definition   
driving accuracy Percentage of tee shots that come to rest in the fairway. 
driving distance Average number of yards per drive. 
putts Average number of putts per round. 
scrambling Percentage of successful up-and-downs. 
GIR  Percentage of greens hit in regulation. 
 
Table 8. Definition of reference point variable. 
Variable Definition   
ref point Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a player has a score in mind the he wants 
to beat in tournament play. 
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Table 9. Summary statistics for sample of players with reference scores. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
Tournament Control Variables      
Par 273 71.73 0.530 70 73 
Round 273 1.612 0.655 1 3 
Length 273 6,638 241.5 6,063 7,156 
year_2018 273 0.641 0.481 0 1 
Reference Score Variables      
Reference Score 273 76.19 2.903 70 85 
ref_under_80 273 0.971 0.169 0 1 
ref_equal_80 273 0.147 0.354 0 1 
ref_under_75 273 0.531 0.500 0 1 
Tournament Score Variables      
Score 273 77.49 4.558 67 97 
score_under_80 273 0.703 0.458 0 1 
score_under_75 273 0.278 0.449 0 1 
 
Table 10. Probabilistic model – results for sample of players with reference scores. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES score_under_80 score_under_80 score_under_80 score_under_75 
     
Par -0.118* -0.132** -0.100 -0.0877 
 (0.0677) (0.0671) (0.0687) (0.0643) 
Round 0.0738* 0.0716* 0.0690 0.0420 
 (0.0438) (0.0434) (0.0435) (0.0424) 
Length -3.32e-05 -1.35e-05 -8.66e-05 3.82e-05 
 (0.000142) (0.000141) (0.000143) (0.000142) 
year_2018 -0.0393 -0.0605 -0.0650 -0.0171 
 (0.0589) (0.0578) (0.0575) (0.0579) 
ref_under_80 0.427**    
 (0.170)    
ref_equal_80  0.0593   
  (0.0743)   
ref_under_75   0.203*** 0.223*** 
   (0.0554) (0.0523) 
     
Observations 273 273 273 273 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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